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Abstract
We examine whether underwriters have an information advantage over other institutional
investors in new public companies. Focusing on ﬁrms targeted by IPO‐related class
action litigation and a matched sample of nonsued ﬁrms, we ﬁnd evidence suggesting that
lead underwriters retain an information advantage in the ﬁrms they take public and that
they capitalize on this information by closing out or reducing their holdings in sued ﬁrms
prior to the eventual litigation date. An examination of analyst opinions suggests that
analysts afﬁliated with lead underwriters are reluctant to reduce their earnings forecasts or
downgrade sued ﬁrms before the litigation date.
JEL Classification: G11, G12, G14, G18, K22

I. Introduction
The primary goal of this study is to examine whether underwriters retain an information
advantage in ﬁrms they take public and whether they capitalize on their superior
knowledge better than other institutions. We distinguish between money managers
afﬁliated with lead underwriters, managers afﬁliated with other members of the
underwriting syndicate, and unafﬁliated institutional investors, and examine their relative
abilities to anticipate negative developments in new public companies at an early stage
and whether and to what extent they decrease positions in such ﬁrms over time.
To answer our research questions we investigate initial levels as well as changes
in lead underwriter, syndicate member, and unafﬁliated institutional ownership around
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Research Council (SSHRC) and Germany’s Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
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IPO‐related lawsuits. In these lawsuits, investors and their law ﬁrms typically accuse
the IPO ﬁrm of having omitted from or misrepresented material negative information in its
IPO prospectus that would have affected the investors’ decision to invest in the company.
We choose litigation announcements because we hypothesize that they are not entirely
unexpected for the ﬁrm itself and those parties that have an information advantage about
the ﬁrm.
Institutional investors have long been considered as being more sophisticated
than individuals and there is abundant empirical evidence that supports this “smart
money” view of the industry. For example, there are several studies that document a
positive correlation between changes in institutional ownership and returns in secondary
markets (e.g., Nofsinger and Sias 1999; Barabanov and McNamara 2013; Sias, Starks,
and Titman 2006). One implication of the “smart money” theory is that professional
money managers are more sophisticated than individuals and are therefore more
successful at avoiding poorly performing ﬁrms or at selecting winning stocks than the
average individual investor. In addition to examining differences in the trading behavior
of institutional and individual (retail) investors, a large body of research has investigated
differences in trading patterns among different types of institutions, that is, banks,
mutual funds, and so on. Yet, unlike for seasoned ﬁrms, there are few studies that
examine institutional ownership trends for new public companies. Speciﬁcally, we are not
aware of any studies that compare the trading of lead underwriters, syndicate
members, and nonunderwriting institutions in young IPO ﬁrms. Our study attempts to
close this gap.
If lead underwriters rely on the same information and employ the same analytical
methods as syndicate members and other (unafﬁliated) institutions, we would not expect
them to be more successful than syndicate members and other institutions in the post‐IPO
market. However, unlike syndicate members and other institutions, lead underwriters are
often personally familiar with the managers of the ﬁrms they take public and are more
likely to be aware of material developments within IPO ﬁrms at the time of the IPO and
thereafter. Moreover, they should be in a good position to judge management’s abilities
because they have personally dealt with the ﬁrm’s managers over an extended period. This
implies that even if all material information is properly disclosed in a ﬁrm’s IPO
prospectus, lead underwriters remain better positioned to understand the company’s
business and to correctly interpret management’s ability to react to any post‐IPO
developments that may affect the ﬁrm. Furthermore, it is likely that during their roadshow
underwriters will gain valuable insights into the concerns that other institutions have
about the issuing ﬁrm and its industry, which, once aggregated, will provide them with a
clearer overall picture about the investing industry’s opinion about the ﬁrm. Taken
together, lead underwriters are not only likely to have better access to hard information
about the ﬁrms they take public but are also in a position to build up a considerable “soft
information” advantage relative to other institutional investors.1 Consequently, lead
underwriting ﬁrms may be able to better understand company prospects at the time of the
1

The use of soft information by underwriters has been examined previously, albeit not in an IPO context. For
instance, Butler (2008) ﬁnds that investment banks with a local presence are better able to assess soft information
about local borrowers and place difﬁcult municipal bond issues.
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IPO, better interpret ﬁrm‐ and industry‐speciﬁc developments that affect the company
after its IPO, and further enhance their information advantage by collecting and analyzing
information about similar ﬁrms and sectors by underwriting IPOs or secondary offerings
for other ﬁrms in the same industry. We hypothesize that these factors allow lead
underwriters to not only enter the IPO aftermarket with a static information advantage that
allows them to identify “at‐risk” companies early on but that they also dynamically
enhance their information advantage over time. Based on this premise, our ﬁrst hypothesis
(Hypothesis 1a) proposes that lead underwriters decrease their holdings in sued IPOs
(with which they are associated) during quarters T2 and T1, where quarter T includes
the lawsuit announcement date. Similarly, we hypothesize that nonlead members of
the underwriting syndicate and other (unafﬁliated) institutions do not signiﬁcantly
decrease their holdings in sued IPOs during quarters T2 and T1, where quarter T
includes the lawsuit announcement date (Hypothesis 1b).
We ﬁnd support for prior anecdotal evidence about net institutional selling in
recent IPOs as ﬁrst empirically documented by Field and Lowry (2004). Furthermore,
our ﬁndings reveal that institutional owners sell their positions sooner and to a greater
extent in IPOs that are subject to subsequent class action litigation than in nonsued IPOs.
Most important, we document that lead underwriters are more proactive than
unafﬁliated institutions in selling shares of IPO ﬁrms that are later sued. Nonlead
members of the syndicate do not exhibit any signiﬁcant abilities in identifying potential
litigation targets and in avoiding ownership in these ﬁrms. Unlike institutions that were
not part of the underwriting syndicate, lead underwriters appear to capitalize on their
information advantage at least one more time when they start acquiring back positions in
recent IPOs shortly after the litigation is announced. All of our ﬁndings are consistent
with institutions in general and lead underwriters in particular being well‐informed
investors, who are actively trading on their information advantage. In addition, we
hypothesize that the trading behavior of lead underwriters before the litigation
announcement is positively related to the abnormal returns of sued ﬁrms, particularly if
they are able to predict lawsuits that hit the market by surprise. Thus, our second
hypothesis (Hypothesis 2a) proposes that lead underwriters have superior information
and are able to reduce their stock holdings during the period T4 to T1 in ﬁrms that are
sued by surprise, that is, in ﬁrms that experience signiﬁcant negative cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) around the lawsuit announcement date. In the same vein, we
argue that nonlead members of the underwriting syndicate and unafﬁliated institutions
do not have superior information and are not able to reduce their holdings before
unexpected lawsuits (Hypothesis 2b).
Our results show that lead underwriters’ stock holding changes from T4 to T1
are positively related to the CARs of sued ﬁrms during a (1,1) event window around the
announcement date, suggesting they are able to identify potential litigation targets better
than other market participants.
Furthermore, we explore whether an institution’s trading decisions conform to
the earnings forecasts provided by its analysts. In our ﬁnal hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) we
argue that lead underwriter‐afﬁliated analysts adjust their earnings forecasts downward
before the lawsuit announcement to a lesser extent than analysts afﬁliated with nonlead
members of the underwriting syndicate and other (unafﬁliated) institutions.
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Although most institutions show a tendency to make large downward revisions in
their earnings forecasts before a lawsuit, we ﬁnd evidence that suggests that lead
underwriter‐afﬁliated analysts make considerably smaller such revisions for sued ﬁrms
before the litigation date, even though lead underwriters and lead underwriter‐afﬁliated
money managers signiﬁcantly reduce their positions during that time. For uninformed
investors who blindly incorporate these observable trends in earnings forecasts into their
trading decisions, this ﬁnding is disconcerting as it suggests a discrepancy between what
lead underwriters say and do, that is, an inconsistency in the behavior of their in‐house
analysts and afﬁliated money managers. The trading patterns of nonlead members of the
underwriting syndicate and other (unafﬁliated) institutions are generally more in line with
the earnings forecasts provided by their analysts.
Our results of lead underwriters’ informational advantage are in line with prior
ﬁndings in the literature. For instance, Rowley and Baum (2008) examine 40 years of IPO
data and show that lead underwriters derive an information advantage from having a better
ability to network. By possessing this unique quality, lead underwriters can select any
nonlead underwriters. On the other hand, nonlead managers have restricted abilities to
improve their network and can only accept or reject offers presented to them but cannot
initiate or choose other nonlead underwriters. All in all, Rowley and Baum show that lead
underwriters are better able to use and improve upon their network position than nonlead
underwriters.
Furthermore, Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000) and Corwin and Schultz (2005)
provide evidence suggesting that lead underwriters have both an information advantage
and full control of the going‐public process whereas nonlead underwriters play at best a
subordinate role. They argue that lead underwriters perform a variety of crucial tasks that
arise when a company plans to go public (e.g., bookbuilding, marketing the issue,
networking, consulting, assisting with exchange listing, etc.). The competition among
investment banks to become one of the lead underwriters for an issue can often be ﬁerce
for the largest and most desirable IPOs, as underwriters vie for top positions in
underwriter rankings and seek higher fees associated with a lead position. Lead
underwriters also have control over and can limit the number of co‐managers to avoid
competition during the IPO process. Nonlead underwriters have less work and are usually
cheap to include. Overall, Corwin and Schultz conclude that lead underwriters have sole
power to determine the offer price for an issue and can essentially ignore nonlead
underwriters.
A growing body of literature examines the dual nature of underwriting and
market‐making activities by investment banks. Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000), for
example, document an information advantage for lead underwriters by showing that lead
underwriters are dominant market makers and that they generate positive trading proﬁts
that are increasing in the level of underpricing. Moreover, Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara
note that after the market closes on the day before the issuance date, the ﬁrm and the lead
underwriter meet to discuss the ﬁnal offer price and the exact number of shares to be sold.
Nonlead underwriters do not play a vital role in this or any other pricing decisions.
A recent example that demonstrates the information advantage and sole control
by lead underwriters is Facebook. Morgan Stanley was one of the lead underwriters for
Facebook’s May 18, 2012, IPO. A June 18, 2012, Wall Street Journal article notes:
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Morgan Stanley hosted all major group presentations on the “roadshow” to pitch big
investors. As the tour began, a banker on the underwriting team not at Morgan Stanley asked
a Facebook executive whether his ﬁrm would attend the investor meetings. The banker
recalls that the executive told him no, that Morgan Stanley wants to control the message.
Morgan Stanley emailed other lead underwriters its schedule of meetings the next day with
big investors, including Fidelity Investments and Putnam Investments in Boston and T.
Rowe Price in Baltimore. The other bankers weren’t invited to the meetings.2

Facebook’s IPO illustrates how important lead underwriters are in the IPO
process while nonlead underwriters usually are trivial players.
Our article is related to Barabanov et al. (2008) who examine differences in the
trading behavior of different types of institutions in seasoned ﬁrms that are subject to
litigation under Section 10b‐5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. Barabanov et al. ﬁnd
that institutions that are more active monitors such as mutual funds and independent
investment advisors are more proactive in their trading behavior. On the other hand,
institutions that are largely passive monitors, such as banks, show only a limited reaction
to potential signs of impending litigation. Trading patterns by insurance ﬁrms and
unclassiﬁed institutions are largely unresponsive indicators of potential litigation. Our
study reveals similar institutional trading differences in a post‐IPO context based on the
institutions’ role in the IPO underwriting process.

II. Data
Our data set includes information on IPOs, securities class action lawsuits, institutional
ownership, analyst earnings forecasts, and secondary market returns.
Initial Public Offerings
Our IPO sample is based on information provided by the SDC Platinum New Issues
database and considers IPOs ﬁled between January 1990 and December 2003. We
exclude American Depositary Receipts, reverse leveraged buyouts, spinoffs, IPOs by
ﬁnancial ﬁrms, limited partnerships, real estate investment trusts, closed‐end funds, unit
offerings, and issues with offering prices below $5 from our IPO sample. For each IPO,
we use the SDC database to identify the lead and co‐lead underwriter(s) as well as the
remaining members of the underwriting syndicate.3 Daily adjusted prices and returns as
well as market capitalization data are obtained from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP). Firms that we cannot identify on CRSP or for which CRSP data are
incomplete or missing are excluded from our analysis. As a further restriction, we only
consider NASDAQ‐listed ﬁrms in our study. Because over 92% of all IPOs during our

For details, see “Morgan Stanley Was ‘Driver’ on Facebook’s Wild IPO Ride,” Technology Section, Online
Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2012.
3
For expositional convenience, we hereafter refer to a single lead underwriter even if co‐lead underwriters
exist. In cases in which there is more than one lead underwriter, any subsequent calculations are based on an average
of the lead underwriters.
2
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sample period started trading on the NASDAQ, this restriction is less stringent than it may
initially appear and allows us to avoid any possible intermarket differences from listing
requirements to trade execution and processing.4 The resulting data set includes
information on 4,283 IPOs.
Securities Class Action Lawsuits
We match our IPO sample with a litigation data set based on information provided by
Stanford’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (http://securities.stanford.edu); the
Securities Class Action Alert, a monthly newsletter published by the Securities Class
Action Services Division of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS); and the Department
of Justice Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) database. Consistent with
Lowry and Shu (2002), Zhu (2009), and Walker et al. (2012), we limit our sample by only
considering lawsuits ﬁled under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act within three years
of an IPO. In addition, to avoid a contamination of our ﬁndings by post‐IPO price support
activities (see, e.g., Aggarwal 2000; Fishe 2002) or insider sales restrictions, we exclude
IPOs that were sued during the initial six‐month lockup period. This restriction, together
with the requirement that we must have at least two quarters after the lockup period but
before the litigation date during which we can measure institutional ownership changes,
effectively restricts our litigation data set to lawsuits that were ﬁled between one year and
three years after an IPO. Our litigation data set thus covers January 1991 to December
2006. During that period, we identify 488 lawsuits that were ﬁled against issuers in
connection with their IPO. This number includes 297 “laddering” cases that were brought
against IPO underwriters by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Because of
their inherently different nature, we exclude all laddering cases from our sample.5 The
remaining sample thus consists of 191 ﬁrms that went public between 1990 and 2003 and
were sued in connection with misrepresentations or omissions of material information
from their IPO prospectuses between 1991 and 2006. Out of these, 125 ﬁrms were sued
between one and three years after their IPO.
Institutional Ownership Data
Information on institutional ownership is obtained from the CDA Spectrum database,
which contains detailed information on institutional 13F ﬁlings with the SEC and is
currently maintained by Thomson Financial (previously CDA Investment Technologies),
a part of Thomson Corporation. The database provides consolidated stock holdings for all

4

To ensure that our results are not exchange speciﬁc, we perform a robustness test in which we include IPOs
from all exchanges. Our results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar for this extended sample.
5
In these lawsuits, plaintiffs contend that the underwriters engaged in illegal tactics by soliciting and receiving
kickbacks in exchange for allocations of portions of a company’s IPO, required tie‐in purchases creating an artiﬁcial
demand for the stock, and artiﬁcially inﬂated the price of the stock through “laddering” (requiring purchases of
additional stock in the aftermarket at escalating prices). Issuing ﬁrms are only named as co‐defendants in each of the
297 laddering cases, while underwriters are named as lead defendants. These complaints generally do not allege that
an issuer engaged in any wrongdoing and are therefore distinguishable from the large majority of lawsuits otherwise
represented in our data set (see Hao 2007 for additional details).
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institutional managers ﬁling 13F reports with the SEC.6 Our data set includes 66 quarters
of recorded ownership data starting with September 1990 and ending in December 2006.7
We calculate the proportion of shares outstanding held by all institutional owners as:
% Institutional Ownership ¼

N
X

si =S;

ð1Þ

i¼1

where N is the number of institutional managers reporting their positions on form 13F, si is
the number of shares owned by institutional manager i, and S is the total number of shares
outstanding. We also identify institutional investors associated with investment banking
ﬁrms.
To ensure the reliability of our results, it is important to correctly identify the
afﬁliation of money managers and analysts with different investment banks. Determining
these afﬁliations is a tedious process. We ﬁrst manually determine any afﬁliations by
using 13F holdings. We further use the CDA/Spectrum Mutual Funds Holdings database,
usually referred to as the Spectrum 1&2 database, to conﬁrm the reported holdings for
afﬁliated mutual funds in each IPO ﬁrm. The Spectrum 1&2 database includes mutual
fund ﬁlings with the SEC and information for an additional 30,000 global funds. The
database reports holdings for each stock at the fund level. We exclude mutual funds with
reported assets of less than $1 million under management at the time of reporting. Note
that the underwriter lockup period typically does not apply to afﬁliated money managers.
However, we did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence that afﬁliated money managers reduce their
positions during the lockup period of IPO ﬁrms that are sued within 6 to 12 months after
the IPO. This result implies that the information advantage enjoyed by lead underwriters
is not necessarily transferred to their afﬁliated money managers during the lockup period.
In a second step, we use the CUSIP for each IPO ﬁrm to match reported
institutional holdings with our IPO sample. Because the actual allocations are not publicly
available, we proxy for the initial IPO allocations by examining the ﬁrst reported holdings
within six months of the offer date for each IPO.
We manually identify investment‐bank‐afﬁliated mutual funds by matching the
names of fund management companies with the names of investment banks, and by using
a variety of sources including the Investment Company Institute, Moody’s Bank and
Finance Manual, Nelson’s Directory of Institutional Money Managers, the Securities
Industry Yearbook, and company websites. In matching the names, we presume that a
prestigious investment bank would protect its brand name and only allow its afﬁliated
funds to use it. Next, we use the above sources to supplement and conﬁrm the afﬁliations
we determined during the initial name match. During our sample period, there are several
mergers or demergers and acquisitions among investment banks; thus, we include their
predecessors, as well. For example, JP Morgan Chase is the product of series of mergers

6

Note that the total proportion of institutional holdings may be slightly greater than the reported number,
because only those institutions with holdings greater than $200,000 or 10,000 shares of stock are required to report
their positions on the 13F form. Most institutions, however, report all of their positions.
7
The September 1990 starting date is again related to the requirement that we do not consider any IPO‐related
lawsuits ﬁled during the initial six‐month (two‐quarter) lockup period.
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involving JP Morgan Chase, Chemical Bank, Hambrecht & Quist, and Manufacturers
Hanover, among others. We include all of them in the data set. We also use the SDC
Merger and Acquisition database and the corporate histories shown on the websites of
some underwriters to make sure the identiﬁed afﬁliations are sensitive to mergers and
acquisitions.
As to afﬁliated analysts, we limit our attention to the 100 institutions with the
most analyst recommendations in I/B/E/S to simplify the data collection process of the
I/B/E/S data (see also Jordan, Liu, and Wu 2012). Afﬁliated analysts are deﬁned as
analysts employed by lead investment banks that have IPO activities in our sample period
and also have afﬁliations with institutional investors in Thomson Financial’s CDA/
Spectrum 13f ﬁlings; that is, either there is a parent–subsidiary relation or both are
subsidiaries of another institution. We then identify the lead investment bank with which
an analyst is afﬁliated using the I/B/E/S Broker Translation ﬁle.
To detect the afﬁliation between a lead investment bank and analysts that we
could not ﬁnd from the above sources, we consult Hoovers Online, the Directory of
Corporate Afﬁliations, LexisNexis, and corporate websites.
We detect the afﬁliation relation between money managers and investment banks
from Hoovers Online, LexisNexis, corporate websites, and the Directory of Corporate
Afﬁliations. To identify the exact period of each relation, we check for M&A news in
LexisNexis and the Wall Street Journal. We then calculate the fraction of the shares
outstanding owned by each lead underwriter and all afﬁliated money managers as well as
the proportion of shares outstanding that is owned by other members of the underwriting
syndicate and their afﬁliated institutions. The remainder of all institutional holdings (i.e.,
positions owned by institutions not afﬁliated with any of the underwriters) comprises
holdings by other (unafﬁliated) institutions.
To include positions held by all reporting branches, divisions, or sister ﬁrms
afﬁliated with the lead underwriter or a syndicate member, we manually identify all
related institutional entities that ﬁle quarterly 13F forms. In calculating positions held by
an underwriter we aggregate holdings reported by all related money managers. For
example, an underwriter may be afﬁliated with independent investment advisors, mutual
funds, banks, or managing trusts that are registered in different states and ﬁle separate 13F
forms with the SEC.
We also account for mergers when determining afﬁliations. For instance, if an
investment bank that was the lead underwriter for an IPO merged with another bank and if a
reporting money manager who is afﬁliated with either one of the banks reported holdings
within a year of the IPO, that manager is considered an afﬁliated institutional investor.
We do not treat co‐managers as lead underwriters because these underwriters are
not book‐runners, leaving the lead manager (and, in some cases, the co‐lead manager) to
allocate the vast majority of shares (see Chen and Ritter 2000; Cliff and Denis 2004). We
further follow Cliff and Denis (2004) and identify IPOs that have joint lead managers or
that have more than one underwriter that help manage the book (i.e., issues with SDC
codes BM, JB, or LM). For these IPOs, we treat all lead managers as one. For instance,
Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) acquired Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette (DLJ) in 2000.
If DLJ served as the lead underwriter in a 1999 IPO, any holdings reported in 2000 by a
CSFB‐afﬁliated money manager would be classiﬁed as lead underwriter holdings.
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As a ﬁnal step in our sample construction process, we identify for each IPO
whether the lead underwriter, members of the underwriting syndicate, and/or institutional
money managers associated with these institutions report holdings to the SEC on Form
13F. IPOs with no reported holdings by underwriters are excluded from our analysis (cf.
Binay, Gatchev, and Pirinsky 2007). This reduces our ﬁnal sample to 96 issuing ﬁrms that
were sued in IPO‐related securities class action lawsuits within one and three years after
their issue date and had at least one underwriter that reported holdings in the ﬁrm.
Table 1 provides an overview of our IPO and litigation sample. In the ﬁrst ﬁve
columns we outline our sample construction process. Furthermore, in columns 6 to 8 we
provide information on the eventual outcome of our sample cases as of June 2009.
Because all of the securities class actions in our sample were either resolved by means of a
settlement or a voluntary/involuntary dismissal rather than an actual verdict, we
differentiate between cases that have been settled, cases that have been dismissed or
withdrawn, and cases that are still pending in court or whose outcome is unknown.8
With few exceptions, one can observe that the litigation rate, that is, the
proportion of sued IPO ﬁrms (column 3) relative to all IPO ﬁrms that go public in a given
year (column 2) remains relatively constant at approximately 5% throughout our sample
period, suggesting that about 1 of every 20 issuers eventually ﬁnds themselves the subject
of an IPO related class action. As the last three columns suggest, a majority of these cases
are settled, while only about one‐fourth are dismissed or withdrawn.
Analyst Earnings Forecasts
When evaluating trends in analyst opinions, we use information on analyst earnings
forecasts that we obtained from Thomson’s I/B/E/S‐Firstcall database. For each ﬁrm in
our IPO sample, we calculate the mean and median analyst earnings forecast for two
quarters into the future.9,10
To distinguish among different types of analysts, we follow our earlier
classiﬁcation scheme and separate analysts into three groups: (1) those afﬁliated with the
lead or co‐lead underwriter for the IPO, (2) those afﬁliated with nonlead members of the
underwriting syndicate, and (3) all other analysts. As such, our approach is consistent with
prior studies about IPO‐related analyst recommendations such as Cliff and Denis (2004)
8
Note that for consistency with our IPO sample, all lawsuit‐related information in Table 1 is reported under the
year in which the respective IPO ﬁrm went public, not the year in which it was sued.
9
Our results are similar when we consider earnings forecasts for the quarter immediately following the lawsuit
or when we consider forecasts for three or four quarters ahead. We choose earnings forecasts for two quarters into the
future as the underlying data are richer than for long‐term forecasts, thus providing us with the highest number of
data points (comparatively fewer analysts issue long‐term forecasts for recent IPOs).
10
Our sample period largely precedes the reforms made by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, signed into law by
President Bush July 30, 2002. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act has altered the relations among analysts, underwriters, and
the IPO ﬁrms they take public. Although it would be interesting to examine the impact of Sarbanes–Oxley on our
ﬁndings, there are too few IPO‐related lawsuits after this reform to draw any reliable conclusions on how it affected
information asymmetries for sued IPO ﬁrms. Furthermore, Sarbanes–Oxley is not likely to affect the answer to our
main question, that is, whether underwriters possess and act upon their information advantage over nonunderwriting
institutional investors. Moreover, it would be interesting to explore how Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD),
implemented by the SEC in October 2000, affects our ﬁndings. It is likely, however, that the selective disclosure by
management may have contributed considerably to the institutional information advantage we document in this
study.
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TABLE 1. IPO Litigation—Summary Statistics.

IPO
Year

Number
of IPOs

Number
of IPO
Firms Sued
under
Section 11
of the 1933
Securities Act

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Total

107
234
285
409
367
435
592
488
313
478
382
73
67
53
4,283

7
16
21
28
11
22
24
15
13
12
15
3
2
2
191

Number
of IPO
Firms Sued
between
One Year and
Three Years
After Their IPO

Number of
Sued IPO
Firms in
Which at
Least One of
the Underwriters
Held Shares

Settled

Dismissed/
Withdrawn

5
12
13
20
8
13
12
11
10
6
10
2
2
1
125

3
9
11
15
6
9
10
9
8
4
8
2
1
1
96

3
7
8
11
5
7
7
6
5
2
6
1
1
0
71

0
2
2
3
1
2
3
2
3
2
2
1
0
0
25

Case Outcomes

Note: Our IPO litigation sample combines information on 4,283 new equity issues ﬁled between January 1990 and
December 2003 with data on 191 IPO‐related securities class action lawsuits ﬁled from January 1990 to
December 2006 as well as information on the eventual outcome of these lawsuits as of June 2012. Our IPO data are
based on information provided by the SDC Platinum New Issues database. IPOs with offer prices below $5, unit
offers, closed‐end funds (including real estate investment trusts), American Depositary Receipts, reverse leveraged
buyouts, limited partnerships, equity carve‐outs, and foreign issues are excluded. Sued IPOs are identiﬁed by cross‐
referencing our IPO data set with litigation information provided by Stanford’s Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse (SCAC), the Securities Class Action Alert (SCAA), and the Department of Justice Public Access to
Court Electronic Records (PACER) database. Laddering cases ﬁled against the underwriters in which issuers are
named as codefendants are excluded from our sample. Column 1 labels our sample period. In column 2, we list the
number of IPOs per year. Column 3 lists the number of IPO ﬁrms that went public in a given year and were
subsequently sued in an IPO‐related lawsuit under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. In column 4, we only
consider lawsuits that were ﬁled against the issuing ﬁrms within a one‐ to three‐year period after their issue date. In
column 5, we list the number of sued IPO ﬁrms for which the lead underwriter or at least one member of the
underwriting syndicate or their afﬁliated money managers reported holdings to the Securities and Exchange
Commission on Form 13F. In the last two columns, we provide information on the case outcomes against the 96
ﬁrms listed in column 5, based on information provided by SCAA and SCAC as of June 2012.

and James and Karceski (2006). Speciﬁcally, we use the I/B/E/S broker identiﬁcation ﬁle
to determine to what extent an issuer was covered by analysts that are afﬁliated with an
institution in each of our three institutional categories. Just as with ownership data, we
research all ﬁrms that are related to lead underwriters and to nonlead members of the
underwriting syndicate. All remaining analyst data are assigned to unafﬁliated
institutions. Again, we account for mergers when determining afﬁliations.11

11
Similar to Cliff and Denis (2004), we identify analyst coverage for about 93% of our sample on I/B/E/S (89
of 96 IPOs). The remaining ﬁrms are excluded from our analyst‐related calculations.
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Figure I. Event Timeline.

Time Period Conventions
To ensure a convenient interpretability of our results, we deﬁne each variable used in
our subsequent analysis relative to the date on which a ﬁrm is sued. Speciﬁcally, to
compare institutional holdings changes (which can only be observed from quarter to
quarter) with analyst earnings forecasts (which can change on a daily basis) and other
variables of interest, we aggregate most of our nonquarterly data by quarter. Each
quarter is then labeled relative to the quarter during which the litigation announcement
occurred. The timeline in Figure I illustrates our approach. Note that IPOs and lawsuit
announcements can occur at any point during a quarter. Our timeline attempts to
demonstrate this fact. For expositional brevity, we henceforth refer to a quarter ending at
time t as quarter t.
We consider ﬁrms that went public during quarter 1 and were sued in quarter T. In
fact, the IPO and lawsuit can occur at any point between the ﬁrm’s IPO date and quarter T,
respectively. As noted before, we require that the common stock of the ﬁrm has been
trading for at least a year between those two dates. This accounts for the typical six‐month
lockup period and allows us to measure changes in institutional ownership between at
least two consecutive quarters before the lawsuit announcement, that is, between times
T2 and T1.12 We also study the reaction of institutions to lawsuits both during and
after the litigation quarter; that is, we measure changes in institutional ownership between
times T1 and T and for three quarters afterward.13

III. Matching Procedure
Underwriters may reduce their holdings in IPO ﬁrms after the lockup period irrespective
of whether they perceive the ﬁrm to be a litigation target. To control for this possibility, we
perform a matched‐ﬁrm analysis in which we compare changes in institutional ownership
for our sample of sued IPO ﬁrms with a matched sample of nonsued IPO ﬁrms. To be
included as a nonsued match, the matched ﬁrm must have had its IPO within þ/ six
months of the sued ﬁrm, must not have been involved in any securities litigation during
For ﬁrms that are sued more than 15 (18) months after their IPO we also examine institutional holdings three
(four) quarters prior to the lawsuit announcement. The results remain intact.
13
Note that institutional holdings changes during the litigation quarter (between T1 and T) should be
interpreted with caution as they reﬂect trades that occurred both before and after the lawsuit announcement. We
address this issue in more detail in our Robustness section below.
12
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our sample period, must belong to the same industry,14 and must be similar to the sued
ﬁrm with respect to size and return momentum, as measured by total return over a period
from four quarters to one quarter before the lawsuit (from T4 to T1). Speciﬁcally, we
follow the approach by Sibley and Burch (1979) and Antunovich and Sarkar (2006) and
select a control ﬁrm for every event ﬁrm in our sample by minimizing the global distance
between the two ﬁrms as follows:
sﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðSizeT 4;i  SizeT 4;c Þ2 ðRet T 4;T 1;i  RetT 4;T 1;c Þ2
di ¼
;
þ
s 2Size;T 4
s 2Ret;T 4;T 1

ð2Þ

where di is the Euclidean distance between the event ﬁrm i and control ﬁrm c, SizeT4,i and
SizeT4,c are the market capitalizations of ﬁrm i and control ﬁrm c at time T4, and
RetT4,T1,i and RetT4,T1,c are the returns for the two ﬁrms, calculated over the three‐
quarter period between time T4 and time T1. Finally, s 2Size;T 4 and s 2Ret;T 4;T 1 are the
cross‐sectional variances of the average market values and returns, respectively.
Matching by industry controls for variations in litigation risk and institutional
holdings across industrial sectors as documented, for example, by Lowry and Shu (2002),
Bajaj, Mazumdar, and Sarin (2003), and Li and Masulis (2005). Matching by size controls
for earlier ﬁndings by Alexander (1991), Zhu (2009), and Walker et al. (2012) that suggest
that plaintiffs and their law ﬁrms preferentially target so‐called “deep pocket” defendants,
that is, large ﬁrms that are likely to settle for larger amounts. In addition, size matching
controls for the institutional propensity to invest in higher capitalization stocks (see, e.g.,
Gompers and Metrick 2001; Bennett, Sias, and Starks 2003). Finally, by matching by
prelitigation return momentum, we can distinguish between reductions in institutional
ownership due to perceived litigation risk and institutional exit from poorly performing
IPOs. Moreover, it allows us to control for the possibility that disgruntled shareholders
and attorneys may resort to opportunistic class‐action litigation against recent IPOs
experiencing poor returns on their stocks. Thus, every sample ﬁrm has the same calendar
period as its matching sued ﬁrm, operates in a similar industry, and has a similar size and
return momentum in the prelitigation period.15,16

14

To examine industry effects, we adopt the breakdown of Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Cliff and Denis
(2004) and categorize ﬁrms as technology (tech) ﬁrms and nontech ﬁrms. Tech ﬁrms are those with the following
SIC codes: 2833–2836, 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3661, 3663, 3669, 3674, 3812, 3823, 3825–3827, 3829,
3841, 3845, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7370–7375, or 7377–7379.
15
Our ﬁndings are highly robust to virtually any reasonable matching procedure considered. For instance, we
also considered industry matches based on two‐digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) codes and on the
industry classiﬁcation by Breeden, Gibbons, and Litzenberger (1989) who identify 12 major industrial sectors of SIC
codes that are selected to maximize the correlation of returns for ﬁrms in each sector. Moreover, we substituted our
simultaneous size and return momentum matching approach with stricter routines in which we ﬁrst match on size
(considering various size brackets) and then on the closest return momentum, and vice versa. Furthermore, we
considered simpliﬁed matches based on time, industry, and only one of size or momentum for the ﬁnal matching
variable. Finally, we matched on short‐term return momentum (employing returns from T2 to T1 instead of
returns from T4 to T1).
16
The results are insensitive to controlling for three‐month (T2 to T1) or six‐month (T3 to T1)
momentum, rather than nine‐month momentum, before the litigation date.
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Figure II. Abnormal Stock Price Performance of Sued Firms around the Litigation Date. We plot the
abnormal stock price performance of sued IPO ﬁrms around the lawsuit announcement date, denoted as
day 0. Our sample consists of 96 IPO‐related securities class action lawsuits ﬁled within one and three
years after the issue date under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act between January 1991 and
December 2006. In each of these IPOs, at least one member of the underwriting syndicate reported
holdings to the Securities and Exchange Commission on Form 13F. We calculate a ﬁrm’s cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) following a market model approach. The ﬁrm’s beta is proxied for by the
average beta of all ﬁrms in the same industry (all ﬁrms with the same three‐digit Standard Industrial
Classiﬁcation code), calculated over a three‐year period ending four quarters before the lawsuit
announcement. Market returns are calculated based on the Center for Research in Security Prices NYSE/
AMEX/NASDAQ value‐weighted market index.

Figure II presents a time‐series depiction of the abnormal stock price returns for
sued ﬁrms around the litigation date. The CARs steeply decline from 250 trading days
before the litigation date and then continue to decline until about 45 days after the
litigation date. The CARs slightly increase until the end of our event window, that is, 250
trading days after the litigation date.
In Table 2, we present comparative statistics for sued and matched nonsued ﬁrms.
We employ a series of variables that have been shown to be related to litigation risk (see, e.g.,
O’Brien and Bhushan 1990; Jones and Weingram 1996; Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson
2001; Barabanov et al. 2008) and to institutional trading behavior (see, e.g., Grinblatt,
Titman, and Wermers 1995; Gompers and Metrick 2001; Bennett, Sias, and Starks 2003).
We describe our sued and nonsued subsamples based on a series of ﬁrm
characteristics and performance measures. Similar to Barabanov et al. (2008), we decompose
the return between T4 and T1 (which was used as part of our matching routine) into a
long‐ and short‐term performance component, namely, RetT4,T2 (which measures the
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TABLE 2. Comparative Statistics for Sued and Matched Nonsued Firms.
Equality Tests
Sued Firms
Variable

Mean

Median

35.40
SizeT4 ($ million) 102.48
8.91% 10.44%
ReturnT4,T2
12.80% 12.51%
ReturnT2,T1
16.71% 17.84%
ReturnT4,T1
0.3146
0.2851
TurnoverT4,T1
0.0772
0.0730
sT4,T2
DsT2,T1
0.0052
0.0028
Financing Dummy
0.17
0.00
CAR(1,1)
4.65% 2.08%

Nonsued Firms
Std. Dev.
86.38
42.19%
48.23%
44.09%
0.0310
0.0358
0.0051
0.38
18.93%

Mean

Median

97.10
35.82
13.17% 12.74%
7.88% 6.64%
15.69% 15.04%
0.2737
0.2166
0.0501
0.0546
0.0011
0.0003
0.42
0.00
0.35% 0.29%

Wilcoxon
T‐Test
Test
Std. Dev. (p‐value) (p‐value)
79.12
49.76%
30.49%
50.12%
0.0278
0.0293
0.0045
0.50
1.96%

.659
.141
.097
.378
.021
.009
<.001
<.001
<.001

.954
.373
.032
.341
.008
.014
<.001
<.001
<.001

Note: We present descriptive statistics for both sued ﬁrms and matched nonsued ﬁrms. Matched ﬁrms must not have
been involved in any securities litigation during our sample period, must have had their IPO within þ/ six months of
the corresponding sued ﬁrm, must belong to the same industry as the sued ﬁrm (following the categorization of
Loughran and Ritter 2004 and Cliff and Denis 2004 who distinguish between tech and nontech ﬁrms), and must have
the smallest Euclidean distance relative to the sued ﬁrm in terms of both market capitalization (measured one day
before the lawsuit announcement) and total return (measured from four quarters to one quarter before the lawsuit, i.e.,
from T4 to T1). We characterize our sample ﬁrms along several dimensions: the market capitalization at time T4
converted to 1990 dollars based on Consumer Price Index (CPI) data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (SizeT4),
the return between time T4 and T2 (ReturnT4,T2), the return between T2 and T1 (ReturnT2,T1), the share
turnover between T4 and T1 (TurnoverT4,T1), the standard deviation of daily returns between time T4 and
T2 (sT4,T2), the quarterly change in the standard deviation of daily returns from the quarter ending at T2 to the
quarter ending at T1 (DsT2,T1), a ﬁnancing dummy that identiﬁes whether the ﬁrm received any debt and/or equity
ﬁnancing between the IPO date and the litigation date (Financing Dummy), and the announcement return measured as
the cumulative abnormal return during the three days surrounding the lawsuit announcement date (CAR(1,1)).

return between T4 and T2), and RetT2,T1 (which measures the return during the
prelitigation quarter, i.e., from T2 to T1). As promoted by the design of our matching
routine, sued and matched nonsued ﬁrms are very close in both average and median market
capitalization and in momentum returns measured from T4 to T2 and from T2 to T1.
When examining short‐term momentum, however, we observe that sued ﬁrms experience an
accelerated decline in prices during the quarter immediately preceding litigation. The
difference between the mean return of 12.8% for sued ﬁrms and 7.88% for the matched
nonsued sample during the period T2 to T1 is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
In addition, we observe that in the three quarters leading up to the litigation date,
sued ﬁrms experience a signiﬁcantly higher prelitigation share turnover and a higher return
volatility (measured as the standard deviation of daily returns) relative to nonsued ﬁrms. The
return volatility of sued ﬁrms increases particularly during the last prelitigation quarter,
whereas it remains comparatively stable for nonsued ﬁrms. As such, our results are similar to
those of Barabanov et al. (2008) who document similar stock price developments before
litigation announcements against seasoned (non‐IPO) ﬁrms. When examining the post‐IPO
ﬁnancing activities of sued and nonsued ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that nonsued ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly
more successful in obtaining additional ﬁnancing than are sued ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, we
employ a ﬁnancing dummy similar to that of Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson (2001) that
identiﬁes whether a ﬁrm received any debt and/or equity ﬁnancing between the IPO date and
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the litigation date (based on information about secondary equity offerings and debt issues
contained in the SDC database). Similar to Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson who ﬁnd that sued
ﬁrms apply for and receive signiﬁcantly less additional capital after their IPO, our results
suggest that 42% of nonsued ﬁrms re‐enter the capital markets during that period, while only
17% of sued ﬁrms raise additional capital. Finally, we examine the abnormal stock price
performance of sued and nonsued ﬁrms during a three‐day period surrounding the
announcement day, that is, during a (1,1) event window.
IV. Stock Price Performance and Institutional Holdings Changes around
Securities Class Action Announcements
The extant literature shows that sued IPO ﬁrms suffer signiﬁcant stock price declines during
the year preceding the litigation event.17 During the subsequent year—a period characterized
by many lawsuits being resolved by means of a settlement or voluntary/involuntary dismissal
—sued ﬁrms tend to recover some of their losses (tests of this price recovery are weakly
signiﬁcant when measured, for example, over the period from one quarter to four quarters
after the lawsuit announcement).18 Overall, our results suggest that lead underwriters, who
naturally have superior information about the ﬁrm relative to syndicate members and other
institutions, stand to proﬁt signiﬁcantly from reducing their positions before a lawsuit
announcement. Considering that lead underwriters hold on average 1.44% of the shares in
sued ﬁrms at time T4 and given the sued ﬁrms’ average market capitalization of
approximately $102 million at that time (see our analysis in Table 2), avoidance of the 3%
price drop we document on the announcement day alone would save the average lead
underwriter approximately $44,000. The savings tend to be considerably larger the earlier an
institution eliminates their holdings and the larger the IPO ﬁrm, with early cash‐outs from
large ﬁrms frequently resulting in avoided losses in excess of $1 million.
Institutional Holdings by Type of Institution
Institutions (and lead underwriters in particular) are likely to be better informed about the
quality of a new issue than individual investors. Moreover, as suggested by Field and
Lowry (2004), they remain better informed in the aftermarket. Institutional investors are
well known to receive higher allocations in hot IPOs and, as is shown by Aggarwal,
Prabhala, and Puri (2002), institutional allocations in underpriced issues contain additional
information that is not explained by book‐building and other public information.
To investigate if an institutional investor is capable of foreseeing negative
developments, we examine initial levels and quarterly changes in institutional ownership
before and after a lawsuit announcement.
To provide an estimate of the initial starting point for our subsequent calculations,
we calculate the mean aggregate holdings in sued and nonsued ﬁrms by each of our three
There are numerous studies that examine the stock price performance of sued ﬁrms (see, e.g., Hegde,
Malone, and Finnerty 2003; Grifﬁn, Grundfest, and Perino 2004; Chaghouri and Walker 2005; Thakor 2005; Gande
and Lewis 2009; Zhu, 2009; McTier and Wald 2011; Walker et al. 2012) and they all provide similar conclusions.
18
Our results remain marginally signiﬁcant if we employ buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns, which tend to
provide poorer long‐term performance estimates than the returns obtained via a matched‐ﬁrm analysis.
17
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groups of institutions at time T4. Our results in Panel A of Table 3 suggest that lead (and to
a lesser extent nonlead) underwriters enter our prelitigation period with signiﬁcantly smaller
holdings in sued ﬁrms than in nonsued ﬁrms. The relation is reversed for unafﬁliated
institutions that hold about 33.16% of the shares in a typical sued ﬁrm but only 24.69% of the
shares of nonsued ﬁrms. A possible reason for these discrepancies may be that sued ﬁrms
may have been “hyped up” by the ﬁrm’s ofﬁcers or the underwriters themselves to maximize
the ﬁrm’s offering proceeds even though they are aware that the ﬁrm may turn into a “fallen
angel,” that is, that it may not do well in aftermarket trading or that it may face other problems
down the road. Moreover, our results provide some initial support for our notion that—at
least from a static perspective—underwriters possess an information advantage over
unafﬁliated institutions that allows them to identify potential litigation targets and avoid
investing in those ﬁrms early on. Panel B of Table 3 includes information on 29 IPOs with no
reported underwriter holdings after the offering date. It is not surprising that once we include
ﬁrms with no reported underwriter holdings in our analysis, the ownership levels of lead
underwriters and syndicate members drop. It is interest, however, that the drop is particularly
pronounced for sued ﬁrms and comparatively small for nonsued ﬁrms. The average stakes of
lead underwriters in sued ﬁrms in which they report holdings are 1.44% in Panel A and only
1.29% when we include ﬁrms with no reported holdings in Panel B. Similarly, syndicate
holdings in sued ﬁrms with reported holdings are 1.14% but only 1.06% when we include
ﬁrms with no reported holdings. In contrast, unafﬁliated institutions have higher ownership
in sued ﬁrms (an increase from 33.16% to 35.72%) and nonsued ﬁrms (an increase from
24.69% to 25.28%). In unreported results, we observe that the 29 sued ﬁrms with no reported
institutional holdings have more negative CARs around the lawsuit announcement date. All
in all, these results provide additional support for our hypothesis that lead underwriters have
an information advantage. That is, they avoid holding shares in sued ﬁrms that have more
pronounced negative returns at the very beginning.
Institutional Holdings Changes by Type of Institution
Barber and Lyon (1996) provide strong evidence that empirical tests based on changes in
variables of interest, rather than on variable levels, will be better speciﬁed in most empirical
contexts. For this reason, we examine changes in institutional ownership in both a univariate
and multivariate context; that is, we ﬁrst examine ownership changes over time and then
model them in relation to various economic variables of interest. To account for initiations of
new positions (i.e., a positive change from zero holdings), we measure changes in ownership
from period Ti to Tj as the natural logarithm of (1 þ ownership at Tj)/(1 þ ownership
at Ti).19
19

Note that although our estimation approach makes our results somewhat difﬁcult to interpret economically, it
aims to account for all possible ownership realizations. For example, we add one to ownership levels in the
numerator and denominator to ensure that our measure is well deﬁned for both the initiation and termination of an
institution’s investment in a given ﬁrm. For example, the log ratio of a 10% increase in holdings from 0.10 million to
0.11 million would be calculated as ln(0.11/0.10) ¼ 0.0953, which is approximately equal to the actual percentage
increase of 10%. However, when we add 1 to the numerator and denominator, the ratio becomes ln(1.11/
1.10) ¼ 0.009049. For expositional convenience and to achieve an approximate correspondence with the associated
percentage changes, we scale the resulting ﬁgures by a factor of 1,000. For brevity, we hereafter refer to our measure
as the log change in ownership.

Sued
Firms

Lead Underwriters
Nonsued
Firms

1.44%

[<.001]

3.38%

1.14%

Sued
Firms

[.106]

1.77%

Nonsued
Firms

Syndicate Members

33.16%

Sued
Firms

[.043]

24.69%

Nonsued
Firms

Other (Unaffiliated) Institutions

1.29%

23.41
(.064)

T to Tþ1

10.66
(.327)

29.98
(.118)

T1 to T

Tþ2 to Tþ3

25.38
(.021)

T2 to T1

10.93
(.293)

7.12
(.432)

T3 to T2

Tþ1 to Tþ2

5.17
(.643)

T4 to T3

Panel C. Quarterly Changes

T4

[.883]

[.641]

[.043]

[.100]

[.017]

[.054]

[.366]

[<.001]

8.35
(.486)

4.25
(.684)

18.08
(.025)
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(.592)
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(.601)

20.44
(.066)

0.42
(.972)

4.52%

33.72
(.101)

15.04
(.275)

5.48
(.751)

8.93
(.787)

3.81
(.642)

0.67
(.957)

9.56
(.298)

1.06%

[.353]

[.715]

[.259]

[.391]

[.527]

[.777]

[.290]

[.118]

(Continued)

14.43
(.173)

9.25
(.315)

19.27
(.155)

22.84
(.122)

7.15
(.367)

3.77
(.697)

1.13
(.906)

1.95%

0.45
(0.908)

10.22
(0.409)

8.31
(0.305)

0.48
(0.870)

4.93
(0.253)

5.01
(0.402)

4.11
(0.399)

35.72%

[.208]

[.294]

[.939]

[.477]

[.236]

[.167]

[.446]

[.056]

5.99
(0.020)

1.33
(0.648)

9.21
(0.305)

4.85
(0.373)

0.17
(0.936)

6.53
(0.118)

0.81
(0.671)

25.28%

Panel B. Aggregate Institutional Holdings at Time T4 Including the Holdings of Institutions that Do Not Report Their Holdings after the IPO

T4

Panel A. Aggregate Institutional Holdings at Time T4

Quarter
around
Lawsuit
Announcement

TABLE 3. Changes in Institutional Holdings around Lawsuit Announcements by Type of Institution.

.303

.295

.053

.043

.014

.518

.753

.084

.271

Lead vs.
Syndicate

.264

.147

.037

.010

<.001

.720

.160

<.001

<.001

Lead vs.
Unaffiliated

.016

.119

.150

.169

.883

.361

.126

<.001

<.001

Syndicate vs.
Unaffiliated

Comparison of Sued‐Firm Holdings
Changes between Groups (T‐Test p‐values)
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Sued
Firms

Lead Underwriters
Nonsued
Firms

23.09
(.471)

28.99
(.208)

[.328]

[.313]
5.04
(.704)

2.52
(.859)
16.45
(.597)

19.37
(.526)

Sued
Firms

[.759]

[.199]
7.08
(.626)

24.19
(.083)

Nonsued
Firms

Syndicate Members

5.69
(0.512)

17.18
(0.015)

Sued
Firms

[.672]

[.003]
9.15
(0.012)

5.11
(0.193)

Nonsued
Firms

Other (Unaffiliated) Institutions

.423

.057

Lead vs.
Syndicate

35.32%
21.08%
.005

Lead Underwriters

7.78%
10.16%
.058

Syndicate Members

2.56%
5.71%
.124

Other Unaffiliated Institutions

.309

.804

Syndicate vs.
Unaffiliated

Note: We examine changes in the mean holdings of lead underwriters, nonlead members of the underwriting syndicate, and unafﬁliated institutions during various periods before
and after a lawsuit announcement for both sued ﬁrms and matched nonsued ﬁrms. Matched ﬁrms are identiﬁed based on the selection criteria described in Table 2. In our
institutional classiﬁcation, we consider all reporting money managers (e.g., domestic and foreign branches, divisions, sister ﬁrms registered in the same and different countries
and states) afﬁliated with the respective investment banking ﬁrm or division. Holdings of each lead underwriter or other member of the syndicate include positions reported by all
afﬁliated institutions. In Panel A, we report the mean aggregate holdings for each institutional subgroup at time T4. In Panel B, we include 29 IPOs that are sued but in which the
underwriters report no holdings. In Panel C, we report log changes between consecutive quarters. Speciﬁcally, we calculate changes in ownership from period Ti to Tj as the
natural logarithm of (1 þ ownership at Tj)/(1 þ ownership at Ti) and scale the resulting ﬁgures by a factor of 1,000. In Panel D, we report cumulative log changes during the
pre‐ and postlitigation sample period, that is, between T4 and T1 and between T and T þ 3. The table provides p‐values for three types of signiﬁcance tests: (1) for the
signiﬁcance of mean holdings changes from zero (reported in parentheses), (2) for the signiﬁcance of differences in initial holdings and holdings changes between sued and
matched nonsued ﬁrms within each institutional subcategory (reported in brackets), and (3) for pairwise comparisons of sued‐ﬁrm holdings changes among the three types of
institutions (reported in the last three columns). In Panel E, we report the one‐year postlitigation performance for our sued‐ﬁrm sample grouped into quintiles of approximately 19
ﬁrms each based on the lead underwriters’ holdings changes during the ﬁrst two postlitigation quarters.

Top
Bottom
p‐value

Holdings Changes during the First Two Postlitigation Quarters

One‐Year Postlitigation Performance

.104

.025

Lead vs.
Unaffiliated

Comparison of Sued‐Firm Holdings
Changes between Groups (T‐Test p‐values)

Panel E. One‐Year Postlitigation Performance of Firms in the Top and Bottom Quintiles Based on Institutional Holdings Changes Sample ¼ 96 Sued Firms

T to Tþ3

T4 to T1

Panel D. Cumulative Changes Relative to T1 and T

Quarter
around
Lawsuit
Announcement

TABLE 3. Continued.
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Our ownership measure has advantages over the conventional method of
computing ownership changes as [ownership at Tj – ownership at Ti]/ownership at
Ti. First, our measure avoids the problem of being undeﬁned when the ownership at Ti
is zero. Second, our measure increases in magnitude with dollar value changes even when
the conventional percentage change is constant. Hence, it captures the magnitude of dollar
value changes in addition to percentage changes. Our measure and the conventional
measure converge only when the underlying numbers in the calculation are large and
when the actual percentage change in ownership is small. To check the consistency of our
ﬁndings over both the short and long term, we also performed all of our analyses using
conventional measures. The conclusions we draw from the two methodologies are highly
similar.20 A decline in institutional holdings in sued ﬁrms relative to nonsued ﬁrms would
suggest that institutions are able to anticipate impending lawsuits and the frequently
associated negative stock price developments.
In Panels B and C of Table 3, we examine changes in mean ownership levels in sued
and matched nonsued ﬁrms by the three institutional groups. Trends in median holdings
changes are highly similar and are omitted here for brevity. Panel C reports holdings changes
between consecutive quarters, and Panel D reports cumulative changes relative to the end‐of‐
quarter holdings immediately preceding the lawsuit (T1) and following the lawsuit (T). To
evaluate the signiﬁcance of our ﬁndings, both panels provide separate p‐values for the
signiﬁcance of individual holdings changes (i.e., the signiﬁcance of those holdings changes
from zero, reported in parentheses), the signiﬁcance of differences between holdings changes
in sued and nonsued ﬁrms (reported in brackets), and the signiﬁcance of differences between
holdings changes by different types of institutions (i.e., lead underwriters, syndicate
members, and unafﬁliated institutions, reported in the last three columns).
All three groups of institutional owners decrease their holdings in sued IPOs during
the two quarters before the litigation (i.e., from T3 to T2 and from T2 to T1). During
the quarter immediately preceding the litigation (T2 to T1), lead underwriters sell a
signiﬁcant amount of their holdings in sued ﬁrms. The decrease in holdings calculated with
our measure is 25.38, which is signiﬁcantly different (p‐value of .017) from the increase of
6.8 in average lead underwriter holdings in matched nonsued IPOs. We also observe similar
(albeit less signiﬁcant) differences in lead underwriter trading when examining the quarterly
changes two quarters before litigation (i.e., during the period T3 to T2).
Nonlead members of the underwriting syndicate and unafﬁliated institutions
exhibit similar behavior during the two prelitigation quarters, yet their quarterly holdings
revisions are consistently smaller than for lead underwriters. All institutions (and
underwriters in particular) continue to decrease their positions during the litigation quarter.
When examining postlitigation trading activity, we can make two interesting
observations. First, it appears that some underwriters and unafﬁliated institutions
reacquire shares after the litigation announcement. Second, lead underwriters show a
tendency to unload some of their holdings in matched nonsued ﬁrms. For example, once
the lawsuit has been announced, lead underwriter positions in sued ﬁrms increase by
23.41 (mean log change from T to T þ 1), whereas they fall signiﬁcantly in matching
20

The results are available upon request.
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nonsued ﬁrms (18.08 log decrease in the mean). These changes in mean ownership are
signiﬁcantly different from each other (p‐value of .043). The drop in underwriter positions
for matching nonsued ﬁrms after a lawsuit announcement is consistent with a situation in
which underwriters are afraid that once a ﬁrm has been sued, a similar ﬁrm in the same
industry may be a future litigation target. In unreported median tests, we further ﬁnd that
median ownership by lead underwriters drops for both sued and nonsued ﬁrms during that
period. This discrepancy between mean and median holdings changes in the postlitigation
quarter suggests that the lead underwriters’ reacquisition of shares in previously sued
ﬁrms is selective. We address this phenomenon in more detail later.
Comparison of Institutional Holdings Changes
To examine whether some institutions are more informed than others, we perform a series of
tests in which we compare holdings changes by different types of institutions. Speciﬁcally,
we test for the signiﬁcance of differences in sued‐ﬁrm holdings changes for all possible
pairwise comparisons among the three institutional categories. If lead underwriters indeed
possess an information advantage relative to other institutions, we expect them to decrease
their sued‐ﬁrm holdings to a signiﬁcantly larger extent than both nonlead underwriters and
other (unafﬁliated) institutions. Our results are presented in the last three columns of Table 3.
When comparing the cumulative mean log ownership changes by lead
underwriters over the interval from T4 to T1 of 28.99 with the cumulative log
changes in ownership levels by nonlead underwriters (19.37) and unafﬁliated
institutions (17.18), for example, we ﬁnd the holdings changes by lead underwriters
to be signiﬁcantly smaller than those of the latter two groups with p‐values of .057 (lead
vs. nonlead underwriters) and .025 (lead underwriters vs. unafﬁliated institutions),
respectively. Even stronger differences among the three institutional groups can be
observed during the quarter immediately preceding the litigation (from T2 to T1) with
comparable p‐values of .014 and < .001, respectively.
Although we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant differences between the holdings revisions of
nonlead underwriters and unafﬁliated institutions, our results consistently indicate that
lead underwriters engage in more informed trading before litigation announcements than
the two other institutional groups. In addition to our earlier results that suggest that lead
underwriters possess a static information advantage as early as at time T4 (see Panel A
of Table 3), this indicates that their information advantage also has a dynamic component,
that is, that lead underwriters are better than other institutions at interpreting and reacting
to potential developments that may increase a ﬁrm’s likelihood of being sued.
In summary, our results provide signiﬁcant evidence for aggressive institutional
selling several quarters before a litigation announcement, and they support Hypothesis 1,
which suggests that lead underwriters, not nonlead underwriters and other unafﬁliated
institutions, are able to foresee a potential lawsuit against a ﬁrm. Moreover, lead
underwriters exhibit a signiﬁcantly larger variation in their holdings than other
institutional investors, which supports our notion that lead underwriters indeed retain an
information advantage in the ﬁrms they take public and that they reduce their positions in
eventual litigation targets more aggressively than syndicate members and other
institutions. In unreported results, we also ﬁnd that the number of stocks lead
underwriters repurchase after a lawsuit announcement is higher for dismissed cases than
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for settled cases. The results further show that lead underwriters repurchase shares before
the settlement and dismissal. Overall, these results are consistent with lead underwriters’
information advantage.21
Postlitigation Holdings Changes and Stock Price Performance
After the lawsuit announcement and particularly during the quarter immediately
following the litigation quarter (from T to T þ 1), lead underwriters appear to reacquire
larger positions in sued ﬁrms than nonlead underwriters and unafﬁliated institutions (see
Panels C and D of Table 3). In unreported tests, we observe that these reacquisition
activities are limited to a select few companies (median holdings decline during the same
period), thus pointing to underwriters’ ability to selectively and quickly react to
postlitigation sell‐offs. Speciﬁcally, it appears that lead underwriters reacquire large
stakes in some ﬁrms while they continue to decrease their holdings in most other ﬁrms.
Such a selective reacquisition of previously sold shares would be consistent with
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), who suggest that an investor who obtains information
about an event before its public announcement can beneﬁt from it twice: ﬁrst, by trading
aggressively on his or her information advantage before the public announcement, and
second, by unwinding part of his or her prior trade once the information becomes public.
To shine additional light on Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2005) argument, we
examine whether lead underwriter holdings after the litigation quarter relate to a ﬁrm’s
postlitigation stock price performance or whether lead underwriters are able to distinguish
between ﬁrms that recover well from a lawsuit and ﬁrms that continue to struggle.
Speciﬁcally, we break our sued‐ﬁrm sample into quintiles of approximately 19 ﬁrms each that
group the ﬁrms based on the lead underwriters’ holdings changes during the ﬁrst two
postlitigation quarters, and then we compare the one‐year postlitigation performance between
these groups. Our ﬁndings in Panel E of Table 3 suggest that ﬁrms in the top quintile portfolio
experience an average stock price increase of about 35%, whereas ﬁrms in the bottom quintile
portfolio suffer an additional postlitigation stock price decline of approximately 21%. The
difference in holdings changes is signiﬁcant with a p‐value of .042. Similar quintile analyses
in which we group ﬁrms based on the holdings changes of nonlead syndicate members and
unafﬁliated institutions also suggest a positive relation between holdings changes and
postlitigation stock price performance. However, the performance differences are not
signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Overall, lead underwriters are able to distinguish between
ﬁrms that recover well from a lawsuit and ﬁrms that continue to struggle.
Multivariate Analysis of Ownership Changes around Class Action Litigation
Announcements
In this section, we extend our prior analysis and attempt to explain changes in institutional
ownership in a multivariate framework. Speciﬁcally, we employ a merged sample that
includes both the 96 ﬁrms that were sued and their 96 nonsued counterparts, and regress
21
When we select matching ﬁrms based on their three‐ and six‐month momentum, our conclusions remain
qualitatively intact. Moreover, the quantitative results are even stronger than those based on nine‐month returns.
That is, we ﬁnd that unafﬁliated institutions have no information advantage while afﬁliated underwriters do. The
results are available upon request.
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the change in institutional ownership in each ﬁrm by all institutions (i.e., lead
underwriters, syndicate members, and unafﬁliated institutions) during the prelitigation
quarter (from T2 to T1) against various predetermined ﬁrm‐level variables. We follow
Lowry and Shu (2002), Zhu (2009), and Walker et al. (2012) and identify ﬁrms that were
subject to litigation during our sample period by means of a dummy variable (Sued) that
equals 1 if the ﬁrm was sued, and 0 otherwise. In addition, to examine the relative ability
of each institutional subgroup to anticipate a potential lawsuit against a ﬁrm, we employ
two interaction terms (SuedLead and SuedSynd) in our estimation model. Lead is a
dummy variable equal to 1 for lead underwriters; Synd is a dummy variable for syndicate
members. Consistent with our hypothesis, we anticipate holdings changes by lead
underwriters to be particularly responsive to signs of a potential litigation ﬁling and thus
expect the respective interaction term to be highly negative (indicating that lead
underwriters make particularly large holdings revisions before lawsuits), whereas we
expect less responsiveness by nonlead underwriters and unafﬁliated institutions.
Moreover, we employ a set of three variables that measure changes in earnings forecasts
made by analysts afﬁliated with our three institutional groups. If institutional portfolio
managers rely on the same information set as their sell‐side analysts, we should ﬁnd a
positive relation between changes in analyst earnings forecasts and changes in IPO
ownership by institutional investors. On the other hand, if underwriters provide biased
forecasts—as our earlier results and the ﬁndings of Michaely and Womack (1999) and
Adams (2003) suggest—we expect an insigniﬁcant (and possibly even a negative)
relation between these two variables for lead (and to a lesser extent) nonlead underwriters.
Furthermore, consistent with Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) and
Barabanov et al. (2008), we seek a speciﬁcation that allows for different levels of
responsiveness to shorter and longer term returns before the litigation date. As our proxy
for short‐ and long‐term price momentum, we use the same variables (RetT2,T1 and
RetT4,T2) that we employed in Table 2. Finally, we proxy for the negative surprise
component of a lawsuit announcement with the announcement return measured as the
CAR during a three‐day period surrounding the lawsuit announcement date (CAR(1,1)).
We employ the announcement return as an interactive variable with our Sued dummy
because there is no reason to expect large abnormal returns for nonsued ﬁrms around the
corresponding lawsuit announcement for sued ﬁrms. Notwithstanding our expectations
about institutions’ ability to partially foresee a lawsuit, we expect institutional holdings
revisions to be less pronounced for ﬁrms that are sued largely by surprise, that is, ﬁrms for
which the litigation announcement is associated with a large negative abnormal return.22
In addition, to account for the relative strength of a given lawsuit, that is, to what
extent a case is merited, we further perform a series of regression analyses based only on
our sued‐ﬁrm sample in which we consider a dummy variable that differentiates between
ﬁrms that settled their respective lawsuit (Settled) and ﬁrms that were sued but whose case
22

Similar factors have been used in the extant institutional ownership literature (e.g., Gompers and
Metrick 2001; Bennett, Sias, and Starks 2003). We choose not to include variables such as S&P 500 membership,
ﬁrm age, dividend yield, number of shares outstanding, and book value per share as they are not likely to experience
signiﬁcant changes during our relatively narrow sample period. Furthermore, we do not include turnover or the
standard deviation of returns because they are highly correlated with our return variables.
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was later voluntarily withdrawn or involuntarily dismissed (see our case classiﬁcations in
Table 1). The four sued ﬁrms whose cases are still pending or whose case outcome is
unknown are excluded from our analysis. Because cases that are eventually settled are
likely to have greater merit, their outcomes may be easier to anticipate for informed
parties. We therefore expect institutional holdings changes to be particularly large before
these lawsuit announcements. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) suggest using ﬁrm
ﬁxed‐effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity and for any ﬁrm‐speciﬁc
characteristics. We include these effects in all models. Furthermore, to ensure the
robustness of our results and explore the marginal contribution of our different regressors,
we estimate models that employ various different variable combinations. The general
model that includes all variables may be speciﬁed as follows:
DInstOwni;ðT 2;T 1Þ ¼ b0 þ b1 Suedi þ b2 Suedi Leadi þ b3 Suedi Syndi
þ b4 Settledi Leadi þ b6 Settledi Syndi
þ b7 DEPSLead;i;ðT 2;T 1Þ þ b8 DEPSSynd;i;ðT 2;T 1Þ
þ b9 DEPSOth;i;ðT 2;T 1Þ þ b10 Returni;ðT 4;T 2Þ

ð3Þ

þ b11 Returni;ðT 2;T 1Þ þ b12 Suedi CARi;ð11Þ
þ FirmFixedEffectsi þ ei ;
where DInstOwni;ðT 2;T 1Þ ¼ ln ðð1 þ Owenrshipi;T 1 Þ=ð1 þ Owenrshipi;T 2 ÞÞ for ﬁrm
i. Sued, Lead, Synd, and Settled are dummy variables as deﬁned earlier.
DEPS Lead;i;ðT 2;T 1Þ , DEPS Synd;i;ðT 2;T 1Þ , and DEPS Oth;i;ðT 2;T 1Þ are changes in analyst
earnings forecasts for ﬁrm i when the analyst is afﬁliated with the lead underwriter, a
nonlead syndicate member, or an unafﬁliated institution, respectively. CARi;ð1;1Þ is the
cumulative abnormal return during days (1,1) surrounding the litigation date (day 0).
The model is estimated across institutions and across ﬁrms.
Models 1 to 5 of Table 4 provide our regression results for the full sample of sued
and matched nonsued ﬁrms. We start our analysis with a simple model that only includes
our sued dummy as an explanatory variable (model 1). Although this model suggests that
on aggregate institutions have an ability to foresee an impending lawsuit, subsequent
models in which we include our interaction terms SuedLead and SuedSynd suggest this
result is largely driven by the informed trading activities of lead and, to a lesser extent,
nonlead members of the underwriting syndicate. Consistent with our expectations, we
ﬁnd that lead underwriters are most responsive to our dummy variable that identiﬁes
eventual litigation targets (with highly signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcients in all model
speciﬁcations that employ the SuedLead interaction term). Nonlead underwriters and
unafﬁliated institutions also exhibit some responsiveness, but the respective coefﬁcients
are economically smaller and only marginally signiﬁcant in some models. As such, our
multivariate analysis conﬁrms the ﬁndings of our univariate tests in Tables 3 and 4 that
suggest that lead underwriters are the most proactive of all institutions in reducing their
positions before litigation announcements.
We also ﬁnd evidence that suggests that institutional trades are positively aligned
with analyst earnings forecasts. Particularly interesting in this context is that revisions in
the opinions of afﬁliated analysts (i.e., analysts that are associated with lead and nonlead

Included
192
576
.081
0.289

Included
192
576
.028
0.329

0.0057
(.913)
0.1662
(.001)

0.0016
(.951)
0.0037
(.964)
0.4645
(.002)
0.2404
(.012)

Model 3

Included
192
576
.020
0.475

0.0083
(.824)
0.0644
(.116)
0.2027
(.043)
0.0732
(.487)
0.3785
(<0.001)

0.0523
(.398)
0.0177
(.757)
0.8028
(.003)
0.1024
(.523)

Model 4

0.0708
(.396)
0.1660
(.096)
0.3062
(.037)
0.0566
(.371)
0.2300
(.009)
0.2763
(.040)
Included
192
576
.008
0.510

0.0470
(.331)
0.0026
(.991)
0.4648
(.026)
0.1288
(.191)

Model 5

Included
96
288
.314
0.101

0.1691
(.122)

0.0464
(.076)

Model 6

Included
96
288
.132
0.163

0.0244
(.608)
0.2013
(.077)
0.0956
(.247)

0.0096
(.222)

Model 7

Included
96
288
.081
0.247

0.0187
(.781)
0.1229
(.048)

0.0074
(.920)
0.1790
(.074)
0.0774
(.159)

0.0227
(.862)

Model 8

Included
96
288
.080
0.261

0.0321
(.831)
0.4301
(.262)
0.0426
(.467)
0.0050
(.689)
0.0745
(.213)
0.1664
(.059)
0.0527
(.314)
0.1458
(.091)

0.1020
(.509)

Model 9

Sued Firm Sample: 71 Settled and 25 Dismissed/Withdrawn Cases

0.0071
(.137)
0.2454
(.231)
0.0340
(.750)
0.0101
(.695)
0.1055
(.182)
0.1365
(.180)
0.0424
(.431)
0.0702
(.289)
0.2245
(.103)
Included
96
288
.070
0.318

0.0606
(.524)

Model 10

Note: We perform a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to determine how log changes in institutional holdings vary in reaction to a number of predetermined
variables. Our dependent variable is the log change in institutional holdings of each ﬁrm between T2 and T1 for all institutions (including lead underwriters, nonlead members
of the underwriting syndicate, and other (unafﬁliated) institutions). Our independent variables include a dummy variable that identiﬁes whether the ﬁrm was sued in connection
with its IPO (Sued); two interaction terms that differentiate between holdings changes by lead underwriters and syndicate members in sued ﬁrms (SuedLead and SuedSynd); the
change in average analyst earnings forecasts made by analysts afﬁliated with the lead underwriters, nonlead members of the underwriting syndicate, and other (unafﬁliated)
institutions for two quarters into the future, measured from T4 to T1 (DEPSLead, DEPSSynd, and DEPSOth, respectively); the return between time T4 and T2
(ReturnT4,T2); the return between T2 and T1 (ReturnT2,T1); and an interaction term of our Sued dummy and the announcement return measured as the cumulative
abnormal return on the lawsuit announcement date and the ﬁrst trading day following the announcement (SuedCAR(1,1)). In models 1 to 5, we consider our full sample of 96
sued and 96 matched nonsued ﬁrms. In models 6 to 10, we only consider our sued‐ﬁrm sample and exclude the Sued dummy. Instead, we consider a dummy variable that
identiﬁes ﬁrms that were sued and later settled their lawsuit (Settled) as well as the corresponding interaction terms that differentiate between holdings changes by lead
underwriters and syndicate members in these ﬁrms (SettledLead and SettledSynd). In these later models, we omit four sued ﬁrms from our sample because we could not identify
the case outcome for the respective lawsuits or because the cases were still pending in court as of June 2012. For each regressor, we present coefﬁcient estimates with p‐values that
are adjusted for clustered standard errors in parentheses below. In the last two rows, we present the p‐value for an F‐test and the adjusted R2 for each regression, respectively.

Firm fixed effects
Number of firms
Number of observations
F‐test p‐value
Adjusted R2

SuedCAR(1,1)

ReturnT2,T1

ReturnT4,T2

DEPSOth

DEPSSynd

DEPSLead

SettledSynd

SettledLead

Settled

SuedSynd

SuedLead

Included
192
576
.117
0.167

0.0703
(.064)
0.0058
(.753)
0.4512
(.001)
0.2279
(.003)

0.0816
(.053)
0.1031
(.065)

Intercept

Sued

Model 2

Model 1

Variable

Full Sample: 96 Sued and 96 Nonsued Firms

TABLE 4. OLS Regression for Institutional Holding Revisions.
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members of the underwriting syndicate) are comparatively poor predictors of institutional
trading activity, whereas revisions in earnings forecasts by unafﬁliated analysts exert a
much higher (and more signiﬁcant) inﬂuence on institutional trading.
As expected, we ﬁnd that during the period T2 to T1, institutional holdings
changes and abnormal returns move in the same direction. Finally, we observe that
institutions appear to correctly avoid sued IPOs with a large negative surprise component
of the announcement as measured by our interactive variable SuedCAR(1,1).23,24
Our results for models 6 to 10 in which we only consider our sued‐ﬁrm sample and
explore the ability of institutions to differentiate between settled and dismissed or withdrawn
lawsuits provide some indication that lead underwriters are better able than other institutions
in anticipating merited cases that eventually become settled. The respective interaction term
(SettledLead) is only weakly signiﬁcant in models 7 to 8, however, and loses its signiﬁcance
when we include additional explanatory variables in our regressions. The coefﬁcients for the
other variables in models 6 to 10 are largely in line with what we found in models 1 to 5,
although their signiﬁcance tends to be smaller. Last, we added ﬁrm ﬁxed effects to control for
any ﬁrm‐speciﬁc effects and apply clustering‐adjusted standard errors at the ﬁrm level.
Overall, the results are not sensitive to these changes and our conclusions remain intact.25
That is, the results in Tables 3 and 4 support Hypothesis 1 that suggests that lead underwriters
have superior information about ﬁrms they took public and reduce their holdings in eventual
litigation targets before the companies’ stock price decline.
Regression of CARs on Holdings Changes
To provide further support for our ﬁndings that suggest that lead underwriters have an
information advantage over other institutional investors, we examine ﬁrm stock returns
conditional on lead underwriter selling; that is, we explore how stock returns around the
litigation date (i.e., during a (1,1) event window) relate to the prelitigation holdings changes
by our three institutional subgroups. To assess the relative contribution of each group’s
holdings changes to our empirical ﬁndings, we provide regression results for three models in
which the respective variables are added consecutively. Our results are reported in Table 5.
As expected, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive and higher magnitude coefﬁcient for our
variable that measures holdings changes by lead underwriters (with the associated p‐values
in models 1 to 3 of Table 5 ranging from .022 to .062), whereas the coefﬁcients for holdings
changes by the two other types of institutions are smaller and insigniﬁcant. In addition to the
univariate results presented in Table 3, this result supports Hypothesis 2 and suggests that
lead underwriters, but not nonlead underwriters and unafﬁliated institutions, are able to
23
Unreported tests in which we regress institutional holdings changes separately for each type of institution
suggest that the coefﬁcient estimates for our SuedCAR(1,1) interaction term are notably less signiﬁcant for
nonlead underwriters than for lead underwriters and are largely insigniﬁcant for unafﬁliated institutions, indicating
that lead (and to a lesser extent nonlead) underwriters are better than unafﬁliated institutions in avoiding sued IPOs
with a large negative surprise component of the announcement.
24
We also perform tests in which we employ a variable that measures the announcement return during longer
term event windows, including a variable speciﬁcation that captures the return during the entire litigation quarter
(irrespective of when during that quarter the ﬁrm was sued). Our results are similar when we use those variable
deﬁnitions instead.
25
For the sake of brevity, these results are not reported here but are available upon request.
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TABLE 5. Regression of CAR(1,1) on Holdings Changes by Different Types of Institutions.
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Intercept

0.1025
(.001)
0.6857
(.073)

0.1153
(.534)
0.9494
(.061)
0.1976
(.480)

Included
96
96
.058
0.369

Included
96
96
.047
0.342

0.2311
(.363)
0.7984
(.017)
0.1786
(.536)
0.7143
(.286)
Included
96
96
.025
0.421

DHoldingsLead,T4,T1
DHoldingsSynd,T4,T1
DHoldingsOth,T4,T1
Firm fixed effects
Number of firms
Number of observations
F‐test (p‐value)
Adjusted R2

Note: We report results for a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations in which we regress the cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) during a (1,1) event window surrounding the litigation date (day 0) against the
cumulative holdings changes by different types of institutions. Institutions are categorized as lead underwriters
(Lead), nonlead syndicate members (Synd), and unafﬁliated institutions (Oth). The cumulative holdings change for
each institution (DHoldingsLead,T4,T1) is calculated as the log change in the institution’s holdings at time T1
relative to its holdings at time T4. Our sample consists of 96 ﬁrms that went public between January 1990 and
December 2003 and were the target of an IPO‐related securities class action lawsuit ﬁled within one and three years
after the issue date under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act. In each of these IPOs, at least one member of the
underwriting syndicate reported holdings to the Securities and Exchange Commission on Form 13F. We calculate a
ﬁrm’s CAR following a market model approach. The ﬁrm’s beta is proxied for by the average beta of all ﬁrms in the
same industry (all ﬁrms with the same three‐digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation code), calculated over a three‐
year period ending four quarters before the lawsuit announcement. Market returns are calculated based on the Center
for Research in Security Prices NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value‐weighted market index. For each regressor, we
present coefﬁcient estimates with p‐values that are adjusted for clustered standard errors in parentheses below. In the
last two rows we report results for an F‐test as well as the adjusted R2 for each regression, respectively.

predict lawsuits that hit the market by surprise (as indicated by a large negative CAR(1,1))
and are thus able to change their stock holdings before the lawsuit announcement in the
same direction as the CARs of sued ﬁrms around the litigation date.
V. Changes in Analyst Opinions around Securities Class Action
Announcements
Our results suggest that lead underwriters in particular possess an information advantage
over other market participants in new public companies. In this section, we aim to
examine whether the differences in the trading behavior we documented for our three
institutional groups are also reﬂected in concurrent earnings forecasts made by the
institutions’ sell‐side analysts.
Speciﬁcally, from an analytical standpoint, we aim to explore whether there are
any discernible differences in the earnings forecasts made by analysts afﬁliated with the
lead underwriter, nonlead syndicate members, and unafﬁliated institutions and to what
extent their forecasts correspond to the trading behavior of their respective institutions.
The academic literature provides some evidence of a relation between the
investment banking function of a ﬁrm and its sell‐side analyst recommendations.
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Michaely and Womack (1999) document a signiﬁcant bias by underwriter analysts and
show that the bias is not fully recognized by the market. Dunbar, Hwang, and Shastri
(1999) show that although initial buy recommendations by underwriters are
uninformative, their subsequent recommendations trigger a stronger reaction in the
market as even in the aftermarket underwriters are perceived to be well informed. Adams
(2003), however, provides evidence that the coverage by analysts who are not afﬁliated
with any members of the underwriting syndicate starts later and is more informative for
investors than the coverage by analysts who were involved in the IPO. Our results—
discussed in the remainder of this section—largely support this later view.26 The extant
literature has shown that an increase in the dispersion of analyst forecasts is associated
with an increased probability of litigation (see, e.g., McTier and Wald 2011).
Changes in Earnings Forecasts by Type of Institution
We compare EPS forecasts for our sued and nonsued subsamples based on analyst data
stratiﬁed into the three institutional groups. For consistency, we follow a similar reporting
style as that in Table 3. In Panel A of Table 6, we report information on the average initial
earnings per share (EPS) forecasts made for our sued and nonsued subsamples at time
T4 (measured in US¢). Panel B considers mean changes in EPS forecasts during
consecutive periods, and Panel C provides cumulative mean changes in relation to time
T1 and T. Concurrent trends in median EPS forecasts are largely similar and are omitted
here for brevity.27 All EPS forecast changes in Panels B and C are calculated as DEPSt,
tx ¼ (EPSt  EPStx)/Pt, where t ¼ T3 to T þ 3 and x ¼ 1 to 3; that is, they represent the
change in EPS forecasts from time tx to t (measured in US¢), scaled by the ﬁrm’s stock
price at time t.28,29 When individual brokerage forecasts change during a quarter, we
calculate a time‐weighted average for that analyst.
The results in Panel A of Table 6 suggest that from a static perspective (i.e., with
respect to their EPS forecast levels at time T4), lead‐underwriter‐afﬁliated analysts are

See also James and Karceski (2006) who ﬁnd similar biases by underwriter‐afﬁliated analysts.
In addition, we also explored contemporaneous trends in mean and median analyst recommendations. Our
results are generally weaker when considering recommendation changes and are thus omitted here.
28
Note that if a ﬁrm receives no analyst coverage in two consecutive quarters, we retain the ﬁrm in our data set
but assign a zero change to the respective variables over that period. If an analyst initiates coverage for a ﬁrm for the
ﬁrst time or if his or her coverage ceases during a given quarter, we exclude that analyst from our calculations during
that quarter. We also considered alternative approaches such as using log changes (as we did for institutional
holdings). Our results are qualitatively unaffected when we use other computational approaches. Further note that
because of initiations and terminations in analyst coverage by individual institutions and differences in the stock
prices by which we scale the changes in EPS forecasts, the cumulative changes reported in Panel C of Table 6 do not
always correspond to the quarterly changes reported in Panel B.
29
Note that not all ﬁrms in our sample received parallel coverage by analysts afﬁliated with each of our three
institutional subgroups. Although it would be preferable to limit our analysis in Table 6 to sued ﬁrms and matching
nonsued ﬁrms that were each covered by at least one analyst from each institutional subgroup, this requirement
would exclude too many (particularly smaller) ﬁrms from our sample. Consequently, our results in Table 5 should be
interpreted with some caution as the calculations that underlie the mean changes in earnings forecasts by the three
different types of analysts are subject to some variations in the number of ﬁrms they are effectively based on. As
such, our results provide at best an indication of changes in earnings forecasts by different analysts over time but no
exact ﬁrm‐to‐ﬁrm comparison. Future research that explores trends in analyst opinions in a non‐IPO context should
be able to provide additional insights in this area.
26
27
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Firms

9.47
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0.0697
(.129)
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T3 to T2
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T1 to T
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Tþ1 to Tþ2
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[.605]
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(.585)
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(Continued)
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TABLE 6. Changes in Analyst Earnings Forecasts around Lawsuit Announcements by Analyst Afﬁliation.
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0.0244
(.637)

0.0638
(.416)

[.543]
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0.1874
(.014)

T to Tþ3
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0.0082
(.972)

Sued
Firms

[.070]
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0.0444
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Firms
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.260
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Lead vs.
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Syndicate vs.
Syndicate Unaffiliated Unaffiliated

Comparison of Sued‐Firm EPS Forecasts
between Groups (T‐Test p‐values)

Note: We examine changes in mean earnings forecasts made by analysts afﬁliated with lead underwriters, nonlead members of the underwriting syndicate, and unafﬁliated
institutions during various periods before and after a lawsuit announcement for both sued ﬁrms and matched nonsued ﬁrms. Matched ﬁrms are identiﬁed based on the selection
criteria described in Table 2. Our measure of analyst earnings forecasts is based on forecasts that are made for two quarters into the future, as reported by I/B/E/S‐Firstcall. To
separate analysts based on their institutional afﬁliation, we accessed SDC Platinum to identify the lead underwriter(s) and other members of the underwriting syndicate for each
offering and then used the broker identiﬁcation ﬁle in the I/B/E/S database to assign the analysts to the respective institutions. We consider analysts to be afﬁliated if they are
related to any of the entities associated with the respective lead underwriter or other members of the syndicate (i.e., divisions, foreign or domestic branches, sister ﬁrms of the
underwriting or other member entity). Analysts that cannot be assigned in this manner are classiﬁed as belonging to other (unafﬁliated) institutions. In Panel A, we report the mean
earnings forecasts (measured in US¢) for each institutional subgroup at time T4. In Panel B, we report changes between consecutive quarters. In Panel C, we report cumulative
changes during the pre‐ and postlitigation sample period, that is, between T4 and T1 and between T and T þ 3. All changes are calculated as
DEPSt,tx ¼ (EPSt  EPStx)/Pt(t ¼ T3 to Tþ3 and x ¼ 1 to 3); that is, they represent the change in earnings per share (EPS) forecasts from time tx to t (measured in
US¢), scaled by the ﬁrm’s stock price at time t. The table provides p‐values for three types of signiﬁcance tests: (1) for the signiﬁcance of mean forecast changes from zero
(reported in parentheses), (2) for the signiﬁcance of differences in earnings forecasts and forecast changes between sued and matched nonsued ﬁrms within each analyst
subcategory (reported in brackets), and (3) for pairwise comparisons of sued‐ﬁrm earnings forecasts and forecast changes among the three types of analysts (reported in the last
three columns).

0.0068
(.773)

T4 to T1

Panel C. Cumulative Changes Relative to T1 and T

Tþ2 to Tþ3

Quarter
around
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TABLE 6. Continued.
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much more capable in discerning between potential litigation targets and nonsued ﬁrms
than their counterparts in nonlead underwriting and unafﬁliated institutions. Although
lead analyst EPS forecasts for sued ﬁrms, for example, average only about 9.5 cents, they
are signiﬁcantly higher (at approximately 16 cents) for nonsued ﬁrms (p‐value of
differences ¼.002). In contrast, the EPS forecasts made by analysts afﬁliated with nonlead
underwriters and unafﬁliated institutions tend to differ considerably less between sued
and nonsued ﬁrms and fall closer to a grand sample average that lies at approximately 12
to 13 cents in our sample. This is conﬁrmed by the last three columns in Panel A, where we
test for the signiﬁcance of differences in the EPS forecasts for sued ﬁrms made by the three
different types of analysts. Here, the differences between lead analyst and nonlead analyst
forecasts as well as between lead analyst and unafﬁliated analyst forecasts are signiﬁcant
at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
From a dynamic perspective, that is, when considering changes in analyst
opinions over time, our results in Panel B and C of Table 6 suggest that lead analysts make
signiﬁcant downward revisions in their earnings forecasts for sued ﬁrms relative to
nonsued ﬁrms shortly before the litigation announcement (p‐value of differences ¼.039
during period T2 to T1). At the same time, however, unafﬁliated analysts exhibit
larger and much more signiﬁcant downside revisions in their earnings forecasts for sued
ﬁrms than do the other two groups of analysts. The decrease in average earnings forecasts
for sued IPOs by unafﬁliated analysts is signiﬁcant when considering quarterly changes
from T3 to T2 and from T2 to T1 or cumulative changes from T4 to T1. For
syndicate members the results are signiﬁcantly weaker, with only the cumulative changes
being signiﬁcantly different from zero. In the last three columns of Table 6, we further test
for the signiﬁcance of differences in earnings forecasts among analysts afﬁliated with the
three groups of institutions. Our results support Hypothesis 3 and conﬁrm that before the
litigation quarter, unafﬁliated analysts make signiﬁcantly larger downward revisions in
their earnings forecasts than both lead and nonlead underwriter afﬁliated analysts. The
aggressive downgrading by unafﬁliated analysts combined with the comparatively small
EPS forecast revisions made by lead‐underwriter‐afﬁliated analysts is different from the
large decrease in lead underwriter holdings and the much smaller decrease in unafﬁliated
institutional holdings we observed before litigation announcements, but is consistent with
the positive bias in underwriter recommendations documented by Michaely and Womack
(1999) and Adams (2003).30,31
All groups of analysts continue to revise their expectations downward after the
litigation date. Although the forecasts by analysts afﬁliated with lead and nonlead
members of the underwriting syndicate remained largely constant in the prelitigation
In fact, a similar upward bias can be observed when examining ﬁrms in our matched nonsued sample.
Although they have experienced similar stock price declines as sued ﬁrms, lead underwriters tend to maintain
comparatively high earnings forecasts for these ﬁrms before the litigation quarter whereas earnings forecasts by
unafﬁliated analysts show a steady decrease.
31
Another possible explanation for the comparatively small revisions in earnings forecasts by lead analysts
may be that they provided slightly lower EPS forecasts at time T4 (see our results in Panel A of Table 6), that is, that
they warned investors about possible problems the ﬁrm may be experiencing early on. However, this does not
explain the discrepancy between the changes in EPS forecasts and holdings (which also started out at a signiﬁcantly
lower level at T4).
30
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period, they now exhibit a greater decline relative to the forecasts made by unafﬁliated
analysts. Again, this is not consistent with the behavior of afﬁliated money managers who
start to reacquire shares in sued companies soon after the litigation date.
All of our results suggest that sued ﬁrms undergo a period of signiﬁcant
uncertainty before a lawsuit announcement. The fact that earnings forecasts differ
increasingly before the litigation date suggests that analysts are more and more in
disagreement about the future proﬁtability of the ﬁrm as the lawsuit draws closer.
Although we are unable to discern at this point whether analysts react to problems
that the ﬁrm is experiencing (which ultimately cause it to be sued) or whether they foresee
the actual lawsuit ﬁling, our results clearly indicate a decrease in analyst earnings
forecasts before the litigation date. Moreover, our results suggest that although some
analysts may be able to foresee or react to negative developments within sued ﬁrms, they
fail to exhibit the same level of prudence as demonstrated by institutional money
managers and underwriters in particular who are much more proactive in their actions than
their in‐house analysts.

VI. Robustness Tests
To ensure that our results are not sensitive to changes in sample construction or
methodology we perform a plethora of robustness tests. We are primarily concerned about
the robustness of our results presented in Tables 3 and 6, that is, whether underwriters
possess an information advantage over other institutional investors.
Drawing conclusions from a sample that combines daily data on IPOs and IPO
lawsuits with quarterly institutional holdings is not straightforward. Institutions are not
required to disclose the trades they make during a quarter; thus, we have to rely on end‐of‐
quarter data to estimate changes in institutional ownership over time. A resulting
measurement problem is illustrated by the following example: consider a lawsuit against
an IPO ﬁrm that was ﬁled at the beginning of the third quarter, say July 5. Consistent with
our hypothesis, we expect institutional holdings at the end of the second quarter, that is,
June 30, to be signiﬁcantly smaller than at the end of the ﬁrst quarter due to institutional
sales during the second quarter before the lawsuit announcement.
In contrast, consider a lawsuit that was ﬁled September 20. Because the lawsuit is
announced close to the end of the third quarter, it is likely that we will observe a much
smaller change in institutional positions between the ﬁrst and second quarters. Because in
this case there are more than 80 days before the lawsuit announcement during which
institutions may have sold part of their holdings, we expect changes in institutional
holdings during the prior quarters to be less signiﬁcant. Rather, we expect that changes in
institutional holdings are largely reﬂected at the end of a quarter for lawsuits ﬁled late
during that quarter, and even then they may reﬂect sales or purchases that occurred shortly
after the lawsuit announcement, making their interpretation difﬁcult.
To control for these measurement problems, we perform a robustness test in
which we break down each quarter into three one‐month periods. Similar to Reuter
(2006), we form three subsamples of our data set that contain lawsuits ﬁled during the
ﬁrst, second, and third months of each quarter, respectively, and then re‐perform our
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analysis for each subsample. We consistently ﬁnd that our results are stronger and more
signiﬁcant for lawsuits ﬁled during the ﬁrst month of each quarter, that is, January, April,
July, and October, and they are slightly less signiﬁcant when we consider lawsuits ﬁled in
the last month of each quarter, that is, March, June, September, and December.
Our second robustness test examines whether our results are robust to variations
in the selection criteria for lawsuits. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant changes in our results when we
include non–Section 11 lawsuits in our analysis or when we reduce the period we allow
for a lawsuit to occur from three to two years. Our results are not robust to the inclusion of
laddering cases, but given that these cases are inherently different in nature and primarily
address the underwriter rather than the issuing ﬁrm, it is not surprising that they weaken
our results. In addition, to ensure that our results are robust across different periods, we
perform a robustness test in which we divide our IPO sample into two halves, that is,
January 1990 to December 1996 and January 1997 to December 2003, and test whether
we have similar ﬁndings in each subperiod. Our ﬁndings are little affected as our results
are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the results for the full sample.
We then test whether our results are driven by differences in underwriter
characteristics between sued and nonsued ﬁrms. As an additional matching criterion, we
require that sued and matching nonsued ﬁrms must have been underwritten by an
underwriter of similar reputation. We use the Carter and Manaster (1990), and Carter,
Dark, and Singh (1998) underwriter rankings as revised by Jay Ritter32 to match sued and
nonsued ﬁrms. Although this reduces our sample size by 10 ﬁrms for which we ﬁnd no
matching nonsued ﬁrm, our results are little affected.
In a ﬁnal robustness test we address the link between stock prices and litigation
likelihood. It is important to recognize that the relation between these two factors is not
straightforward. On one hand, we expect stock prices to decline before a lawsuit
announcement as informed investors reduce their positions in the litigation target to avoid
the postannouncement stock price decline that most sued ﬁrms in our sample experience.
On the other hand, we expect that stock price declines themselves increase a ﬁrm’s
likelihood of being sued. As Walker et al. (2012) argue, the larger the stock price decline,
the larger the litigatable loss that plaintiffs can claim in a lawsuit. Given the endogenous
relation between litigation risk and prelitigation stock price performance, it is difﬁcult to
discern to what degree informed investors can predict a lawsuit and to what degree they
react to or anticipate stock price declines. We address these concerns through two
robustness tests.
When examining institutional holdings at the end of the ﬁrst quarter following the
lockup expiration date for all IPOs during our sample period, we observe that lead
underwriters retain an ownership stake of approximately 1.6% in ﬁrms that were
subsequently sued, compared to 3.6% for ﬁrms that were not sued. Similarly, when
examining lead underwriter holdings in ﬁrms that experienced market‐adjusted price
declines of over 20% within two quarters following the lockup expiration date—
irrespective of whether the ﬁrms were eventually sued—we observe that underwriter
32

See Jay Ritter’s website at http://bear.cba.uﬂ.edu/ritter/Rank.htm for a complete list of underwriter rankings.
If there is more than one lead underwriter, we calculate the average reputation of the lead underwriters. The data are
also used in Loughran and Ritter (2004).
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stakes in the “losers” were only 2.5%, compared to a 4.3% ownership stake in the
“winners.” The differences in means and medians for both of these tests are signiﬁcant at
the 5% signiﬁcance level. Similar, but less signiﬁcant, differences can be observed for
nonlead syndicate members and unafﬁliated institutions.
These results suggest that underwriters can not only predict the likelihood of
litigation, but can also predict the likelihood of share price declines that may attract
litigation. In addition to observing signiﬁcant reductions in the holdings by lead
underwriters before lawsuit ﬁlings, we observe that shortly after the IPO lockup period
they retain smaller positions in ﬁrms that experience signiﬁcant price declines regardless
of whether these ﬁrms are ultimately sued.
VII. Conclusions
Institutional investors, through their monitoring of the ﬁrms they invest in, are often
viewed as “smart money” investors. A large body of research has investigated differences
in trading patterns among different types of institutions, that is, banks, mutual funds, and
so on. To our knowledge, there have been no studies that compare the trading of
underwriters and nonunderwriting institutions in young IPO ﬁrms, possibly because of a
lack of speciﬁc event data around which such trading behavior can be measured. We
employ a unique data set of IPO‐related securities class action cases that allows us to
overcome this problem. By examining trading patterns by lead underwriters, nonlead
members of the underwriting syndicate, and other (unafﬁliated) institutions before these
lawsuits, we are able to document that lead underwriters retain an information advantage
in the ﬁrms they take public and are more proactive in reducing their positions in eventual
litigation targets than other institutional investors. Nonlead members of the underwriting
syndicate—although also involved in the IPO process—and unafﬁliated institutions
appear to be less proactive in avoiding sued IPOs. Our results are robust to variations in
our sample selection and to methodological changes.
We further explore trends in analyst opinions around securities class action
announcements. Speciﬁcally, we investigate whether lawsuits are preceded by negative
revisions in analyst earnings forecasts (measured separately for each of our three groups
of institutions) and whether these revisions correspond to the holdings changes within the
respective institutional subgroups. Our ﬁndings suggest that litigation announcements are
preceded by a signiﬁcant deterioration of unafﬁliated analyst opinions about the
respective ﬁrm. At the same time, however, we document a considerable reluctance by
lead‐underwriter‐afﬁliated analysts to lower their earnings forecasts before the litigation
announcement—a pattern that stands in stark contrast to their institutions’ otherwise more
informed trading behavior. Finally, we ﬁnd evidence suggesting that lead underwriters
(and to a lesser extent other institutions) trade back into some ﬁrms after they have been
sued and that they are able to identify postlitigation winners, that is, ﬁrms that recover well
from the lawsuit and the generally associated stock price declines.
From a practical standpoint, our ﬁndings allow investors to better understand the
rationale behind patterns in institutional trading and analyst opinions and the potential
implications these patterns may have on their portfolio. In particular, a substantial
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decrease in analyst opinions and large institutional holdings revisions in the ﬁrst few years
after an IPO provide investors with a possible warning sign that a ﬁrm may get sued.
The results of this study call for more transparency and disclosure. We believe that
regulators and policy makers should consider requiring more frequent trade and position
disclosures, particularly so from underwriters and afﬁliated institutions. Given that we
document well‐informed trading behavior by these institutions despite the fact that we only
had access to data on long positions (which the institutions have to disclose to the SEC on
Form 13F) but not on short positions, warrants, or daily trades, suggests that our ﬁndings
may be even stronger (and institutional behavior even more abusive) than what we
documented here. Large ﬁnancial institutions have been increasingly active on the short
side of trades and may even exploit their information advantages without reporting any
changes in their long positions on Form 13F. A mandatory disclosure of all equity‐related
trades including short sales and derivatives would help promote openness and fairness in
the contemporary marketplace and would reduce the ﬁnancially exploitable information
advantage that well‐informed institutions have over other market participants.
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